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NOTE
Thou Shalt Not Electioneer: Religious Nonprofit
Political Activity and the Threat “God PACs”
Pose to Democracy and Religion
Jonathan Backer*
The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC invalidated a
longstanding restriction on corporate and union campaign spending in federal
elections, freeing entities with diverse political goals to spend unlimited
amounts supporting candidates for federal office. Houses of worship and other
religious nonprofits, however, remain strictly prohibited from engaging in par-
tisan political activity as a condition of tax-exempt status under Internal Rev-
enue Code § 501(c)(3). Absent this “electioneering prohibition,” religious
nonprofits would be very attractive vehicles for political activity. These
501(c)(3) organizations can attract donors with the incentive of tax deduc-
tions for contributions. Moreover, houses of worship need not file with a gov-
ernment agency to begin operating and deriving tax benefits, and the IRS has
shown reluctance to aggressively audit their activities. Two circuits have previ-
ously upheld the electioneering prohibition against legal challenges, but recent
jurisprudential shifts expose the tax code provision to challenge under the Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which directs courts to apply strict
scrutiny to facially neutral laws that substantially burden the free exercise of
religion. First, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. greatly reduced the barri-
ers to successful RFRA claims. Second, by lifting restrictions on political speech
for many other types of organizations, Citizens United magnified the burden
the electioneering prohibition imposes on religious organizations. The decision
also rejected compelling state interests that might have previously shielded the
law from invalidation. This Note is the first analysis of the electioneering pro-
hibition’s vulnerability in this new legal climate. Despite these significant de-
velopments, this Note ultimately concludes that the electioneering prohibition
can survive RFRA challenges because the prospect for widespread use of relig-
ious organizations as conduits for political activity undermines the values re-
flected in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
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Introduction
One month before the 2014 midterm elections, Dr. Jim Garlow, the pas-
tor of Skyline Church in La Mesa, California, broke the law. At his Sunday
church service, Garlow endorsed Democratic U.S. Congressman Scott Peters
in California’s Fifty-Second Congressional District over his openly gay Re-
publican opponent Carl DeMaio.1 “[Y]ou cannot have the advancing of the
radical homosexual agenda and religious liberty at the same time, in the
same nation,” Garlow explained to his congregation.2 While DeMaio shared
many of the pastor’s ideological positions, Garlow instructed his congre-
gants to either support the Democratic incumbent or abstain from the elec-
tion, warning that a DeMaio victory would mark the vanguard of a socially
liberal Republican Party and the absence of a political home for Evangelical
Christians.3
As a condition of tax-exempt status under Internal Revenue Code
§ 501(c)(3), houses of worship—like all charitable organizations—may not
“participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign.”4 A spiritual
leader’s endorsement of a congressional candidate from the pulpit is a text-
book violation of this tax code provision,5 known as the “electioneering pro-
hibition.” As part of an initiative called Pulpit Freedom Sunday, Garlow
delivered his sermon in an act of civil disobedience, joining with other faith
leaders in a coordinated effort to publicly flaunt the law and protest what
1. Tamara Audi, Preaching Politics, Pastors Defy Ban, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 2014, at A6.
2. SkylineChurch, Skyline Church: October 5, 2014 at 47:43, Vimeo (Oct. 6, 2014, 9:31
PM), http://vimeo.com/108190109 [http://perma.cc/4X5V-WGFB].
3. Id.
4. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
5. See I.R.S. News Release FS-2006-17 (Feb. 2006), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Election-
Year-Activities-and-the-Prohibition-on-Political-Campaign-Intervention-for-Section-501%28c
%29%283%29-Organizations [http://perma.cc/8BUL-DXHQ].
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they view as unconstitutional infringement on religious liberty and freedom
of expression. Since 2008, over 3,800 pastors have participated in Pulpit
Freedom Sunday.6 Participating pastors send copies of their sermons to the
IRS, hoping to challenge the law’s validity in court.7 Pulpit Freedom Sunday
participants do not disguise their intentions. Garlow, for example, con-
cluded his 2014 Pulpit Freedom Sunday sermon by saying, “[I]f, by chance, a
member of the IRS gets this sermon and is listening, sue me.”8 More than
ever before, Garlow and other opponents of the electioneering prohibition
may stand poised to realize their goals. Recent Supreme Court decisions lift-
ing restrictions on political speech9 and granting religious exemptions to
facially neutral laws 10 situate the electioneering prohibition at the epicenter
of tectonic jurisprudential shifts.
Left-leaning religious entities also chafe under the restrictions imposed
by the electioneering prohibition. In the aftermath of the 2004 presidential
election, for example, the IRS launched an investigation against All Saints
Episcopal Church in Pasadena, California after its rector, Reverend Ed Ba-
con, delivered an antiwar sermon two days before the election.11 Bacon did
not explicitly endorse a candidate, but depicted Jesus moderating a presiden-
tial debate and reprimanding President George W. Bush by saying, “Mr.
President, your doctrine of preemptive war is a failed doctrine. Forcibly
changing the regime of an enemy that posed no imminent threat has led to
disaster.”12 Ultimately, the IRS concluded its investigation without penaliz-
ing the church but reiterated its position that the church had violated the
law.13 In opposing the investigation, Bacon warned, “If the IRS prevails, it
will have a chilling effect on the practice of religion in America.”14
6. Press Release, Alliance Defending Freedom, Pulpit Freedom Participation Exceeds
1,800 Pastors, Continues Through Election Day (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.adfmedia.org/
News/PRDetail/?CID=81033 [http://perma.cc/JFH8-9YEZ].
7. Alliance Defending Freedom, Pulpit Freedom Sunday: Frequently Asked
Questions and Common Objections 4 (Aug. 15, 2014), http://alliancedefendingfreedom
.org/content/campaign/2014/Pulpit-Freedom-Sunday/Resources/PFS-Recruiting-Packet.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3534-LPCX] (“[I]f a pastor is punished for something he says during a ser-
mon, Alliance Defending Freedom will bring a lawsuit to protect the constitutional rights of
the pastor and the church with the hope of having the Johnson Amendment declared
unconstitutional.”).
8. SkylineChurch, supra note 2 (quotation at 54:30).
9. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock,
132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,
131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
10. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
11. Louis Sahagun, Sermon Moves IRS to Act, L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 2006, at A1.
12. Patricia Ward Biederman & Jason Felch, Antiwar Sermon Brings IRS Warning, L.A.
Times, Nov. 7, 2005, at A1.
13. Sam Kim, IRS Ends Two-Year Probe of California Church’s Anti-War Sermon, Ctr.
for Effective Gov’t (Sept. 25, 2007), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3451 [http://per
ma.cc/6FRU-95RF].
14. Sahagun, supra note 11.
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Despite conflict between the government and both progressive and con-
servative religious entities over the electioneering prohibition, the Supreme
Court has never examined its legality. The Tenth Circuit upheld the provi-
sion under the Free Exercise Clause, holding that the “overwhelming and
compelling Governmental interest . . . [in] guarantying that the wall separat-
ing church and state remain[s] high and firm” justifies any burden imposed
by conditioning tax-exempt status on nonintervention in political cam-
paigns.15 More recently, the D.C. Circuit upheld the provision under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), a statute that requires courts to
apply strict scrutiny to facially neutral federal laws that substantially burden
the free exercise of religion.16 The court held that the electioneering prohibi-
tion does not trigger RFRA scrutiny because it does not substantially burden
the free exercise of religion.17
But since courts last examined the tax code provision, the Supreme
Court has invalidated both state18 and federal19 laws barring corporations
from intervening in electoral politics. These laws resemble the electioneering
prohibition in substance, if not underlying rationale. 20 Additionally, the Su-
preme Court granted closely held corporations RFRA exemptions from the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)’s contraceptive mandate
in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., according substantial deference to the
companies’ characterization of the burden the law imposed on religious
practice21 and undercutting the reasoning used most recently to uphold the
electioneering prohibition. 22
Neither the Tenth Circuit nor the D.C. Circuit closely examined the pur-
pose of the electioneering ban or weighed the importance of its goals against
free exercise values. A more pointed exploration of the issue offers an inter-
esting example of the delicate legal balance required when governmental in-
terests and religious practice intersect. From the earliest days of the republic,
religion has played a crucial role in American civic life. Alexis de Tocqueville
15. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir.
1972).
16. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
For an explanation of the legal standard imposed by RFRA, see infra note 58 and accompany-
ing text.
17. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
18. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam).
19. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
20. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30118), invalidated by
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310, and Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35-227 (2010), invalidated by
Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2490, with I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
21. See 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–79 (2014).
22. Other legal issues raised by the electioneering prohibition not addressed in this Note
include potential free speech challenges to the provision. E.g., Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics
and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious
Organizations, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 875, 887–90 (2001); Erik W. Stanley, LBJ, the IRS, and
Churches: The Unconstitutionality of the Johnson Amendment in Light of Recent Supreme Court
Precedent, 24 Regent U. L. Rev. 237, 266–67 (2012). This Note also does not examine the tax
code provision’s effect on secular charities.
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described religion as a salve to the isolation and uncertainty inherent in
individual liberty23 and as a force capable of encouraging free people to
forgo self-interest in favor of the collective good.24 On the other hand,
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison recognized the capacity of religion,
especially when supported by the machinery of the state, to be a destructive
source of division antithetical to democratic principles.25
Today, public opinion exhibits the same ambivalence. Religion plays an
undeniable and important role in spurring many citizens to social con-
sciousness and action. About two-thirds of Americans believe houses of
worship contribute to solving important social problems, and more than
three-quarters believe that such institutions strengthen morality in society.26
Faith leaders have played central roles in the social movements that have
reshaped American history and sociopolitical reality. But Americans also be-
lieve religion should play a limited role in political discourse, with nearly
two-thirds opposing houses of worship endorsing political candidates and
more than half opposing religious leaders’ involvement in politics entirely.27
Accordingly, public law reifies the tension evident at the republic’s
founding and persisting in the polity today. At the constitutional level, the
Free Exercise Clause28 allows for the flourishing of religious life that Toc-
queville valued, while the Establishment Clause29 prohibits the entanglement
between government and religion that Jefferson and Madison feared.30 At
23. 2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 744–45 (Eduardo Nolla ed.,
James T. Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund 2012) (1835) (“When authority no longer exists in
religious matters, any more than in political matters, men are soon frightened by the sight of
this limitless independence.”).
24. Id. at 745–46 (“[There exists no] religion that does not impose on each man some
duties toward the human species or in common with it, and that does not in this way drag
him, from time to time, out of contemplation of himself.”).
25. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 172 (Richmond, J.W.
Randolph 1853) (“Our sister States of Pennsylvania and New York, however, have long sub-
sisted without any establishment [of religion] at all. . . . They have made the happy discovery,
that the way to silence religious disputes is to take no notice of them.”); The Federalist No.
10, at 46 (James Madison) (“Religion [has] divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with
mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other
than to co-operate for their common good.”).
26. Pew Forum on Religion and Pub. Life, “Nones” on the Rise: One-in-Five
Adults Have No Religious Affiliation 60–61 (2012), http://www.pewforum.org/files/
2012/10/NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf [http://perma.cc/UA3H-7DAU].
27. Id. at 73.
28. U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 2 (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion] . . . .”).
29. Id. cl. 1 (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”).
30. Some scholars and jurists take the position that the Establishment Clause, as origi-
nally conceived, bars only the adoption of a national religion and interference with state estab-
lishments of religion. E.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1835–36 (2014)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Donald L. Drakeman, Church, State, and Original Intent
260–62 (2010); Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protec-
tion Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 311, 317 (1986).
This originalist interpretation of the Constitution finds historical support in many practices
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the statutory level, tax exemptions and deductions incentivize the prolifera-
tion of religious institutions, but the electioneering prohibition disables
those same institutions from exerting the type of influence that other special
interests wield in American politics. By striking this balance, the tax code
attempts to advance the virtues of religion in civic life while limiting its
vices.
This Note contends that, despite Hobby Lobby and Citizens United, the
electioneering prohibition is valid under RFRA. Although it imposes a sub-
stantial burden on the free exercise of religion, the prohibition prevents en-
tanglement between government and religion. Part I examines the origins of
the electioneering prohibition and situates it within the constellation of
campaign finance regulation. Part II argues that the electioneering prohibi-
tion substantially burdens the free exercise of religion by barring religious
organizations from engaging in political advocacy targeted at securing policy
goals rooted in religious belief. Part III argues that the electioneering prohi-
bition cannot be justified as the least restrictive means of arresting the cor-
rupting influence of money in politics or of preventing government
subsidization of partisan political activity. The provision is, however, nar-
rowly tailored to the compelling interest in preventing undue entanglement
between government and religion. Accordingly, Part III concludes that the
electioneering prohibition is valid under RFRA.
I. The Electioneering Prohibition in Context
Though different in origin and purpose, the electioneering prohibition
resembles other limitations that lawmakers have imposed on politically en-
gaged entities. Section I.A discusses the historical origins and evolution of
the electioneering prohibition. Section I.B describes recent decisions over-
turning campaign finance laws and situates the electioneering prohibition
within the wider landscape of political speech regulation. Section I.C argues
that campaign finance deregulation magnifies the importance of the elec-
tioneering prohibition because it alone prevents religious organizations from
exerting unlimited influence over the electoral process.
A. Historical Origins of the Electioneering Prohibition
Little legislative history exists to explain Congress’s purpose when it
adopted the electioneering prohibition as an amendment to the Internal
Revenue Act of 1954. Circumstantial evidence suggests less than altruistic
origins. Senator Lyndon Johnson—the sponsor of the amendment—secured
from the early days of the republic at odds with modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Richard H. Jones, One Nation Under God? 13–15 (2012). This Note takes no position on
the original meaning of the constitutional provision and assumes the continuing validity of the
reigning framework for evaluating potential Establishment Clause violations established in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971), and its progeny.
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office in 1948 by the barest of margins and under dubious circumstances.31
As his sophomore election approached, Johnson feared for his political fu-
ture, and strong evidence suggests that he inserted the electioneering prohi-
bition provision into the pending legislation due to concerns over two
secular nonprofit organizations advocating for his defeat.32 In sponsoring
the amendment, Johnson apparently did not intend to restrict the political
activities of houses of worship; in fact, he relied heavily on church support
for his reelection against a Catholic opponent in overwhelmingly Protestant
Texas. 33
Johnson’s intentions aside, the electioneering prohibition, at its incep-
tion, accorded with limitations placed on other entities formed primarily for
apolitical purposes. The Taft-Hartley Act, enacted in 1947, prohibited un-
ions and corporations (including nonprofit corporations) from spending
general treasury funds in support of or in opposition to candidates for fed-
eral office.34 Like other campaign finance infractions, violation of the corpo-
rate- and union-expenditure ban authorized civil penalties and, in instances
of knowing and willful violations, criminal sanctions.35 Despite the new re-
strictions, corporations and labor unions circumvented and openly violated
Taft-Hartley, undermining its efficacy.36
The electioneering prohibition restricts a broader range of activities
than Taft-Hartley did,37 but it reflects the regulatory ethos of the era that
broadly opposed partisan political activity by groups other than political
committees such as candidate committees, traditional political action com-
mittees (PACs), and political parties.38 In effect, the electioneering prohibi-
tion discouraged circumvention of campaign finance laws by providing a
strong tax incentive for 501(c)(3) organizations to refrain from those activi-
ties that the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited.
31. See Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent 312–14
(1990) (describing a post-Election Day “discovery” of uncounted ballots in a Duval County,
Texas precinct that delivered the Democratic runoff primary to Johnson).
32. Patrick L. O’Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical Perspective of the Per-
meable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 733, 753–62 (2001).
33. Id. at 768–69.
34. Labor-Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159
(1947), invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
35. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5)–(6), (d)(1)(A) (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30109).
36. Jeremiah D. Lambert, Corporate Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1033, 1039–40 (1965).
37. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(1) (prohibiting corporate or union expenditures in
connection with federal elections or primaries), with I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (prohibiting
participation or intervention in any political campaign).
38. United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. (UAW-CIO), 352 U.S. 567, 578 (1957) (“[J]ust as the great corporations had made huge
political contributions to influence governmental action or inaction . . . the powerful unions
were pursuing a similar course, and with the same untoward consequences for the democratic
process.”); V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups 508–12 (5th ed. 1964).
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B. From Super PACs to God PACs
Today, the electioneering prohibition appears incongruous with the re-
strictions on other entities engaged in partisan political activity. Citizens
United v. FEC invalidated the modern iteration of Taft-Hartley’s ban on cor-
porate and union expenditures 39 and gave rise to new vehicles for electoral
advocacy. The decision precipitated a paradigm shift in campaign finance
jurisprudence in two respects. First, the Court overturned prior case law
permitting restrictions on political speech based on the government’s inter-
est in reducing the distortive effects of large aggregations of money in polit-
ics.40 Second, the decision adopted a narrowed definition of political
corruption that sanctions only those regulations targeted strictly at prevent-
ing and punishing overt exchanges of money for political favors.41 Citizens
United led to the creation of super PACs—political committees that may
solicit contributions of unrestricted size and spend unlimited amounts of
money on campaign advertisements, so long as they do not directly contrib-
ute to or coordinate their efforts with candidates.42 The decision also directly
enabled politically engaged 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations—known
colloquially as dark-money groups—to solicit and spend unlimited amounts
while shielding donor names.43 This lack of transparency stems from the
Internal Revenue Code’s comparatively weak disclosure provisions relative to
the rules governing traditional political organizations.44 Super PACs and
dark-money groups have proliferated in state politics as well since the Court
39. 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441b’s ban on corporate- and
union-funded independent expenditures).
40. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–56, 365.
41. Id. at 359 (interpreting valid campaign finance restrictions as combating quid pro
quo corruption); see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (affirming that any
restriction on political speech must combat quid pro quo corruption); Linda Greenhouse, An
Indecent Burial, N.Y. Times (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/opinion/an-
indecent-burial.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/KX85-FC8B] (“It wasn’t until the Roberts court’s
Citizens United decision in 2010 that the court shrank the definition of corruption to quid pro
quo bribery. . . . [I]n his McCutcheon opinion, Chief Justice Roberts . . . extend[ed] Citizens
United’s narrow definition of corruption . . . .”).
42. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that contribu-
tion limits are unconstitutional as applied to an independent expenditure-only group); Dave
Levinthal, How Super PACs Got Their Name, Politico (Jan. 10, 2012, 12:57 PM), http://www
.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71285.html [http://perma.cc/Q6YM-Y39V].
43. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319 (identifying Citizens United as a nonprofit corpora-
tion); Kim Barker, Two Dark Money Groups Outspending All Super PACs Combined, ProPub-
lica (Aug. 13, 2012, 12:50 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/two-dark-money-groups-
outspending-all-super-pacs-combined [http://perma.cc/3XRU-5V8Z]; FAQs, Citizens
United, http://www.citizensunited.org/frequently-asked-questions.aspx [http://perma.cc/
ZG5K-4NN4].
44. See Additional Discussion of H.R. 5175, the DISCLOSE Act, Democracy is Strengthened
by Casting Light on Spending in Elections: Hearing on H.R. 5175 Before the H. Comm. on H.
Admin., 111th Cong. 113–15 (2010) (statement of Brennan Center for Justice).
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extended Citizens United to invalidate state bans on corporate independent
expenditures in American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock.45
The creation of new entities operating in the post-Citizens United cam-
paign finance framework continues. McCutcheon v. FEC invalidated the cap
on the aggregate amount that individuals may donate annually to political
parties, traditional PACs, and candidates during an election cycle.46 This has
encouraged the establishment of joint fundraising committees—dubbed
“max PACs”—groups that collect large contributions from single donors
and disperse the money among an assortment of political parties, traditional
PACs, and candidates.47 A rider in a recent $1.1 trillion appropriations bill
increased the amount that individuals may contribute to national political
parties annually, super charging the fundraising capacity of max PACs.48
Still standing amid these sweeping changes, the electioneering prohibi-
tion bars 501(c)(3) charities—including religious organizations—from par-
ticipating in the bonanza of unregulated electoral activity central to the past
three election cycles.49 Political operatives would gain significant advantages
from electioneering through religious nonprofits. First, while 501(c)(3)s en-
joy tax-exempt status just as 501(c)(4)s and political committees do,50 con-
tributions to 501(c)(3)s are also tax deductible.51 The ability to attract
donors with the promise of a tax benefit would greatly aid political groups
in generating revenue. Second, houses of worship, unlike other charitable
organizations or political committees, need not file with government agen-
cies before securing tax benefits.52 A house of worship need only hold itself
45. 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam). See generally Chisun Lee et al., Bren-
nan Ctr. for Justice, After Citizens United: The Story in the States (2014), http://
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/After%20Citizens%20United_Web_Fi
nal.pdf [http://perma.cc/T99R-CWTP].
46. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
47. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456; Eliza Newlin Carney, ‘Max PACs’ Poised to Exploit
Supreme Court Decision on Campaign Finance, CQ Wkly. (Apr. 29, 2014, 9:12 AM), http://
public.cq.com/docs/weeklyreport/weeklyreport-000004464536.html [http://perma.cc/2VKF-
3SZU].
48. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30116); Press Release, Democracy
21, Who Shot John: The Story of How $777,600 Contribution “Limits” Ended Up in the
Omnibus Bill (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.democracy21.org/legislative-action/press-releases-
legislative-action/fred-wertheimer-who-shot-john-the-story-of-how-777600-contribution-lim-
its-ended-up-in-the-omnibus-bill/ [http://perma.cc/MB2G-5YZJ].
49. See generally Adam Crowther, Pub. Citizen, Outside Money Takes the Inside
Track (2012), http://www.citizen.org/documents/outside-spending-dominates-2012-election-
report.pdf [http://perma.cc/ETS9-GFED]; Sundeep Iyer, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Post-
Election Analysis: 2012 Toss-Up House Races (2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/publications/Post-Election%20Analysis%202012%20Toss-Up%20House%20Races
.pdf [http://perma.cc/5LXE-7QWA]; Ian Vandewalker, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Elec-
tion Spending 2014: 9 Toss-Up Senate Races (2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/analysis/Buying_Time/Election_Spending_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/6QKX-
2BHL].
50. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(1)(a), (c)(3), (c)(4), 527(a) (2012).
51. Id. § 170(a)(1), (c)(2).
52. 26 C.F.R. § 1.508-1(a)(3)(a) (2015).
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out to the public as a house of worship to begin deriving advantage from
tax-exempt status and soliciting tax-deductible contributions.53
Together, the advantages available to houses of worship under the tax
code, if utilized for political purposes, could build on the deregulated foun-
dation established by super PACs, dark-money groups, and max PACs.
Without the electioneering prohibition and without additional changes to
the tax code, groups claiming to be houses of worship could sprout up dur-
ing election season and solicit unrestricted tax-deductible contributions
from the public to spend in unlimited amounts supporting or opposing can-
didates for political office. These hypothetical organizations—which this
Note refers to as “God PACs”—would further contribute to the trend of
elections being bankrolled by secretive groups financed by a small coterie of
wealthy donors seeking to reshape the landscape of American politics.54
C. The Continued Importance of the Electioneering Prohibition
Despite the seeming incongruity between the electioneering prohibition
and the prevailing deregulatory climate surrounding political speech, the
provision serves distinct and important purposes that necessitate its survival.
In an era in which outside spending plays such an outsized role in the politi-
cal process, the electioneering prohibition takes on even greater importance.
God PACs could have severe consequences for American democracy. Criti-
quing the view that special interest groups effectively represent individuals
in the political process, Professor Schattschneider observes, “The flaw in the
pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class
accent.”55 By this, he means that the proliferation of interest groups fails to
ensure a political system responsive to the will of the people because the
wealthy have the resources to ensure better representation of their views.56
Similarly, permitting religious organizations to join super PACs, dark-
money groups, and max PACs in contributing to the electoral discourse
could lead to a chorus that sings from a sectarian hymnal and imprints pub-
lic policy with religious values alien to many or even most citizens’ beliefs.
As the outcomes of recent campaign finance decisions suggest, however,
the 501(c)(3) electioneering prohibition is vulnerable to challenge on free
speech grounds. For a restriction on political speech to pass constitutional
53. IRS, Tax Guide for Churches & Religious Organizations 3 (2013), http://www
.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf [http://perma.cc/9SXZ-B3MP].
54. See Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for
501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 Geo. L.J. 1313, 1318 (2007) (“Because [501(c)(3)s]
will be the only organizations to receive a subsidy for campaign speech, these organizations
will become ideal entities for political campaign donors[ ] . . . [as] mechanisms or conduits for
unlimited tax-deductible political contributions.”).
55. E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democ-
racy in America 34–35 (2d ed. 1975).
56. See Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the
New Gilded Age 257–67 (2008) (providing empirical evidence of senator ideology and roll
call vote responsiveness to high- and middle-income constituents’ ideology and issue prefer-
ences, but not those of low-income constituents).
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muster, the law must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est.57 Because the electioneering prohibition specifically restricts religious
organizations from engaging in partisan political activity, these groups may
also challenge the provision under RFRA, under which laws that substan-
tially burden the free exercise of religion must be the least restrictive means
of furthering a compelling state interest.58
This Note assesses the validity of the electioneering prohibition under
RFRA, instead of under the Free Speech Clause, for two reasons. First, the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hobby Lobby articulated a test for deter-
mining whether facially neutral laws substantially burden the free exercise of
religion that is significantly more deferential to the party claiming the bur-
den than prior RFRA case law.59 The decision’s rationale could prove fruitful
to religious organizations eager to engage in political activities. Second, ex-
amining the validity of the law under RFRA allows for a careful examination
from the vantage point of religious practice and the role of religion in Amer-
ican democracy. Since constitutional review under the Free Speech Clause
would also subject the electioneering prohibition to strict scrutiny,60 a nar-
rower examination of the law’s validity under RFRA may reveal arguments
that would be helpful in countering a broader free speech challenge to the
provision.
II. The Electioneering Prohibition Substantially Burdens
Free Exercise Rights
While the electioneering prohibition has survived judicial scrutiny in
the past, recent developments in free exercise and campaign finance juris-
prudence unsettle the assumptions on which those prior decisions relied.
Section II.A examines the rationale by which the D.C. Circuit upheld the
electioneering prohibition under RFRA. Section II.B highlights a trend of
increased deference to organizations claiming that facially neutral laws bur-
den their religious practice, typified by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. Section II.C argues that Citizens United v.
FEC forecloses the argument that the electioneering prohibition does not
burden the free exercise of religion because other avenues exist for religious
organizations to engage in political activity.
A. Past Application of RFRA to the Electioneering Prohibition
The sole appellate court to consider the validity of the 501(c)(3) elec-
tioneering prohibition under RFRA upheld the provision by finding that it
did not substantially burden the free exercise of religion.61 In Branch Minis-
tries, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the revocation of a religious nonprofit’s tax-
57. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
59. See infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
60. Johnson, supra note 22, at 887–89.
61. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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exempt status after a church affiliated with the organization placed full-page
campaign ads in the Washington Times and USA Today four days before the
1992 election.62 The ads condemned then-Arkansas Governor Clinton’s po-
sitions on social issues including abortion, homosexuality, and contracep-
tion, stating, “Bill Clinton is promoting policies that are in rebellion to
God’s laws,” and asked readers, “How then can we vote for Bill Clinton?”63
The advertisements also invited readers to make tax-deductible contribu-
tions to the church.64
The D.C. Circuit held that the electioneering prohibition did not sub-
stantially burden the church’s free exercise of religion because “the Church
does not maintain that a withdrawal from electoral politics would violate its
beliefs.”65 Even if the church did engage in politics as a matter of religious
conviction, the court stated in dicta that the church’s free exercise of religion
still would not be substantially burdened because it could separately incor-
porate as a 501(c)(4) social welfare organization, which could in turn form a
PAC arm that could participate in political campaigns.66 The court reasoned
that any burden imposed on Branch Ministries’ free exercise of religion
could be avoided through other channels for the political speech it deemed
central to its faith.67 No burden on the free exercise of religion existed be-
cause the government imposed no restriction on the quantity or quality of
the group’s speech; it merely controlled the manner by which the group
could speak by requiring it to funnel its advocacy through the media of a
501(c)(4) and affiliated PAC.68
The corporate structure the D.C. Circuit envisioned to accommodate
Branch Ministries’ desire to engage in political activity is quite common.
Like 501(c)(3)s, 501(c)(4)s are nonprofit corporations exempted from pay-
ing federal corporate income taxes,69 but they may engage in a greater degree
of political activity.70 Additionally, donations to 501(c)(4)s, unlike
501(c)(3)s, generally are not tax deductible as charitable contributions.71
62. Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17–18 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 211
F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142.
66. Id. at 143.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 143–44.
69. I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(4) (2012).
70. Compare id. § 501(c)(3) (prohibiting propaganda and lobbying that constitutes more
than a substantial part of the group’s activity and categorically banning participation or inter-
vention in political campaigns), with id. § 501(c)(4) (providing no limits on political activity
provided that the organization exclusively promotes social welfare).
71. See id. § 170(a)(1), (c)(2) (exempting charitable contributions to “corporation[s],
trust[s], or community chest[s], fund[s], or foundation[s] . . . organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes,” but making no
mention of 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations).
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Examples of prominent 501(c)(4) organizations include the Sierra Club72
and NARAL Pro-Choice America73 on the left and the National Rifle Associ-
ation74 and the Koch brothers’ Americans for Prosperity on the right.75 And
as the Branch Ministries court recognized, federal campaign finance law per-
mits 501(c)(4)s to operate PAC arms that may engage directly in federal
elections by making contributions to candidates and by soliciting contribu-
tions for that purpose.76 As a result, all but one of the aforementioned orga-
nizations operates PACs.77 By contrast, 501(c)(3)s may not operate PACs.78
But this does not prevent 501(c)(4)s—even those connected to PACs—from
affiliating with 501(c)(3)s.79 Accordingly, each of the aforementioned groups
also affiliates with 501(c)(3)s.80
B. Hobby Lobby’s Deferential Burden Analysis
Recent cases examining the burdens imposed by facially neutral laws on
the free exercise of religion have evaluated requests for exemptions with
greater deference than the Branch Ministries court did. Most notably, the
Supreme Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. held the contraceptive
mandate of the ACA invalid under RFRA,81 engaging in a shallow substantial
burden prong inquiry.
72. Gift Planning: Supporting the Sierra Club Family, Sierra Club, http://vault.sierraclub
.org/giftplanning/family/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/N7RJ-RYDH] [hereinafter Supporting
the Sierra Club].
73. Mission Statements, NARAL Pro-Choice Am., http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/
about-us/mission-statements.html [http://perma.cc/LA98-R658].
74. Ring of Freedom: Give Now, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, https://www.nra.org/rof/give.aspx
[http://perma.cc/A2DW-TDCH] [hereinafter Ring of Freedom].
75. Donate Today, Ams. for Prosperity, http://americansforprosperity.org/do-
nate_today [http://perma.cc/7Q93-N75Q]. Americans for Prosperity and its affiliates have
been tied to the energy magnates David H. and Charles G. Koch. Carl Hulse & Ashley Parker,
Koch Group, Spending Freely, Hones Attack on Government, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2014, at A1.
76. 26 C.F.R. § 1.527-6(f) (2015); Holly Schadler, Alliance for Justice, The Con-
nection: Strategies for Creating and Operating 501(c)(3)s, 501(c)(4)s, and Political
Organizations 59 (3d ed. 2012), http://bolderadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/
The_Connection_paywall.pdf [http://perma.cc/HDH3-B3B4]; see also 2 U.S.C. § 432 (2012)
(recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30102) (listing requirements for establishing political committees).
77. See About PFV, NRA-PVF, https://www.nrapvf.org/about-pvf/ [http://perma.cc/BNC
7-FV3F]; Mission Statements, supra note 73 (NARAL Pro Choice America PAC); Sierra Club:
2016 PAC Summary Data, OpenSecrets.org, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.php
?strID=C00135368 [http://perma.cc/L4ZA-NCJX].
78. 26 C.F.R. § 1.527-6(g); Schadler, supra note 76, at 71 n.1.
79. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (find-
ing an organization may utilize a 501(c)(3) status for nonpolitical activities and its 501(c)(4)
affiliate for lobbying and political expenditures).
80. See AFPF Legal Status, Ams. For Prosperity, http://americansforprosperity.org/legal
[http://perma.cc/3NKH-K95J]; Mission Statements, supra note 73 (NARAL Pro-Choice
America Foundation); Ring of Freedom, supra note 74 (NRA Foundation); Supporting the Si-
erra Club, supra note 72 (Sierra Club Foundation).
81. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
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In Hobby Lobby, two closely held for-profit corporations that objected to
abortion on religious grounds—Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood—
sought exemptions from the ACA’s contraceptive mandate and argued that
providing their employees with health insurance that covered four contra-
ceptive devices facilitated the destruction of embryos.82 Justice Alito, writing
for the majority, refused to inquire into the causal relationship between the
employer subsidy of contraceptive devices and the destruction of embryos.83
Doing so, he argued, would require courts to analyze the reasonableness of a
religious belief, something “federal courts have no business addressing” and
would “[a]rrogat[e] the authority to provide a binding national answer to
[a] religious and philosophical question.”84 Deferring to the companies’
characterization of the relationship between the law and their religious be-
liefs, the Court had little difficulty identifying a substantial burden, since
failure to comply with the contraceptive mandate would saddle the compa-
nies with heavy tax penalties.85
If applied to Branch Ministries’ political activity, this rationale would
suggest that the electioneering prohibition imposes a substantial burden.
The Branch Ministries court focused its inquiry on the nonprofit’s political
speech itself, rather than what the organization sought to accomplish with
its political activity. Although the court acknowledged that the ads Branch
Ministries placed “reflected its religious convictions on certain questions of
morality,” the court held that the electioneering prohibition did not consti-
tute a substantial burden because engagement in electoral politics did not
itself amount to a tenet of the organization’s faith.86 In essence, the Branch
Ministries court determined the causal relationship between the advocacy in
which the nonprofit engaged and the political ends the organization sought
too tenuous for the electioneering prohibition to amount to a substantial
burden on its free exercise of religion.
Like the owners of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, who believed
that paying for ACA-compliant health insurance could make them complicit
in the termination of pregnancies, Branch Ministries believed that comply-
ing with the electioneering prohibition would make the organization com-
plicit in the election of a President who would adopt policies counter to its
religious beliefs. The effect of a single religious organization’s campaign ad-
vocacy on the outcome of an election—let alone the policies lawmakers
adopt subsequent to the election—may be remote indeed. But, as Justice
Ginsburg argued in her Hobby Lobby dissent, the provision of ACA-compli-
ant health insurance also had a purely theoretical effect on the choices of the
companies’ employees.87 The contraceptive mandate only required Hobby
82. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–66.
83. Id. at 2777–79.
84. Id. at 2778.
85. Id. at 2776–77.
86. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
87. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Lobby and Conestoga Wood to provide health insurance plans that an em-
ployee or dependent could independently utilize to secure free contracep-
tives.88 “Any decision to use contraceptives made by a woman covered under
Hobby Lobby’s or Conestoga’s plan,” Justice Ginsburg reasoned, “will not be
propelled by the Government, it will be the woman’s autonomous choice,
informed by the physician she consults.”89 Similarly, an officeholder’s policy
choices remain several steps removed from an outside spender, even if those
choices embody or undermine values core to the spender’s beliefs. By
prohibiting inquiry into the attenuation between a government policy and
religious exercise, Hobby Lobby explicitly rejected the type of causation in-
quiry that Justice Ginsburg favored.90
Developments since Hobby Lobby provide some preliminary evidence to
suspect a shift in the evaluation of the substantial burden prong of RFRA
claims. The day after issuing its Hobby Lobby decision, the Supreme Court
once again displayed a high degree of deference to a religious organization in
granting an injunction to the Christian liberal arts school Wheaton College,
allowing it to opt out of the contraceptive mandate without filling out the
form that religious nonprofits must submit to insurers to be freed from the
law’s requirements.91 Ironically, in granting the injunction, the Court ex-
empted the college from the very procedure it lauded in Hobby Lobby as a
less restrictive alternative to obligatory compliance with the contraceptive
mandate.92 In granting the injunction, however, the Court offered no analy-
sis at all concerning the burden on free exercise of religion imposed by the
requirement that the college fill out the form.93
Moreover, plaintiffs making RFRA claims in the wake of Hobby Lobby
have cited the decision for the proposition that attenuation between govern-
ment policy and an entity’s religious practice does not render the burden
insubstantial. In Wieland v. United States Department of Health and Human
Services, for example, a Missouri state senator and his wife argued that the
contraceptive mandate forces them to pay for health insurance that will al-
low their dependent daughters to acquire contraceptives in violation of the
couple’s religious beliefs.94 On appeal, the plaintiffs urged the Eighth Circuit
to interpret Hobby Lobby to mean that “[c]laimants like the Wielands are
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2777–78 (majority opinion).
91. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014).
92. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (noting the option for the Department of Health and
Human Services to require insurance companies to separately cover contraceptive costs for
objecting companies’ employees).
93. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807. The Court did caution against reading the injunc-
tion as its views on the merits, id., but the Court’s willingness to grant such an attenuated
religious objection without further inquiry into the substantiality of the burden does suggest a
shift in how the Court approaches RFRA claims.
94. 793 F.3d 949, 952 (8th Cir. 2015).
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judges of whether their consciences are violated, not the Government.”95
The court of appeals did not reach the merits of the claim, but did find that
the couple demonstrated a sufficient causal connection to establish standing,
finding the alleged burden on free exercise of religion “fairly traceable from
HHS’s enforcement or threatened enforcement of the Mandate.”96
The interpretation of Hobby Lobby urged by the Wielands comes close to
converting RFRA’s substantial burden prong into a sincerity test. Few plain-
tiffs would have difficulty making such a showing. For example, in Perez v.
Paragon Contractors Corp., a district court granted a member of the Funda-
mentalist Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints (FLDS) the right to
refuse to answer the Department of Labor’s questions as part of an investiga-
tion into potential child labor violations based on his belief in the need for
secrecy concerning church affairs.97 Because the magistrate judge below
raised no credibility findings, the trial judge found that the plaintiff demon-
strated the sincerity of his belief simply by stating his position under oath.98
Other plaintiffs have read Hobby Lobby somewhat less broadly. In Uni-
versity of Notre Dame v. Burwell, the university, like Wheaton College, ob-
jected to filling out the paperwork necessary to secure an exemption from
the contraceptive mandate.99 Since the ACA requires insurance companies to
directly cover the contraceptive needs of workers whose employers are ex-
empt from the mandate, Notre Dame argued that the requirement burdens
the university’s free exercise of religion by forcing it to facilitate access to
contraception.100 In its petition for a writ of certiorari, Notre Dame noted
that Hobby Lobby:
did not consider whether complying with the regulations would be a “sub-
stantial” violation of the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, or whether it would
require “substantial” physical exertion. Instead, the Court simply noted
that the plaintiffs “object[ed] on religious grounds” to complying with the
regulation, and proceeded to ask whether the plaintiffs would incur a sub-
stantial penalty if they did not comply.101
According to this interpretation, the intervening third parties do not sever
the connection between Notre Dame’s actions and providing contraception
to its students and employees, and the substantial burden inquiry pertains
only to the consequences of failing to comply with the government’s direc-
tives on sincerely held religious grounds.
95. Appellants’ Rule 28(j) Letter at 1, Wieland v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
793 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-3528), ECF No. 50.
96. Wieland, 793 F.3d at 954–55.
97. No. 2:13CV00281-DS, 2014 WL 4628572, at *1, *3–4 (D. Utah Sept. 11, 2014).
98. Perez, 2014 WL 4628572, at *3.
99. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 549–51 (7th Cir. 2014), vacated sub
nom. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 1528 (2015) (mem.).
100. Id. at 553, 557.
101. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25–26, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct.
1528 (2015) (No. 14-392), 2014 WL 4978601, at *25–26 (alteration in original) (quoting
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–79 (2014)).
February 2016] The Threat “God PACs” Pose to Democracy and Religion 635
These readings of Hobby Lobby, of course, do not bind the Supreme
Court or lower courts in any fashion,102 but they do demonstrate the hurdles
that courts will face in trying to distinguish claims for religious exemptions
from those claimed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood. By rejecting at-
tenuation as a means to question the substantiality of the burdens imposed
on religious practice by government regulation, the Court greatly expanded
the potential for individuals and corporations to make successful RFRA
claims. No matter how Hobby Lobby plays out in lower courts, the facile
distinction that the Branch Ministries court made between the action in
which the organization wished to engage (electioneering) and the ends it
sought (among other things, reduced access to abortion and contraceptives)
does not cohere with Hobby Lobby’s substantial burden inquiry.
C. Alternative Outlets for Political Speech Do Not Lessen the Burden
The alternative method identified by the Branch Ministries court for re-
ligious organizations to engage in political activity cannot save the election-
eering prohibition from RFRA review. Under the electioneering prohibition,
religious organizations wishing to engage in political activity find themselves
similarly situated to corporations and labor unions prior to Citizens United
v. FEC, which overturned the ban on corporate and union independent ex-
penditures in federal elections.103 Prior to Citizens United, federal law barred
corporations and labor unions from spending general treasury funds in na-
tional elections.104 But corporations and labor unions could (and still can)
102. Indeed, seven of eight circuits that have evaluated the question have held that the
procedures designed to accommodate nonprofits and closely held companies that object to the
contraceptive mandate do not substantially burden religious exercise, and the Supreme Court
has granted certiorari to resolve the split. Compare Mich. Catholic Conference & Catholic
Family Servs. v. Burwell, Nos. 13-2723, 13-6640, 2015 WL 4979692, at *9 (6th Cir. Aug. 21,
2015) (finding no substantial burden), Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, No. 14-427-cv,
2015 WL 4665049, at *9 (2d Cir. Aug. 7, 2015) (same), Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the
Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1187 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 2015 WL 6759642 (Nov. 6,
2015) (mem.) (same), Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 2015) (same), E.
Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 459 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 2015 WL 4127312
(Nov. 6, 2015) (mem.) (same), Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 611–12 (7th
Cir. 2015) (same), Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422,
439–42 (3d. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Geneva Coll. v. Burwell, 2015 WL 4765464 (Nov. 6,
2015) (mem.) (same), and Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d
229, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 2015 WL 6759640 (Nov. 6, 2015) (same), with Sharpe
Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.3d 927, 937 (8th Cir. 2015)
(finding a substantial burden); see also Marty Lederman, Update on the Contraception Coverage
Regulations and Litigation, Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/07/update-on-
contraception-coverage.html [http://perma.cc/9N27-FZXS].
103. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
104. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30118), invalidated by Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
636 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:619
create PACs funded by voluntary contributions from employees, stockhold-
ers, or members for the purposes of making contributions and independent
expenditures in national elections.105
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that this alternative means
of engaging in the political process did not alleviate the First Amendment
injury caused by the corporate-expenditure ban. First, the Court reasoned
that corporations and their connected PACs are separate entities and that a
PAC’s speech cannot serve as a proxy for corporate speech.106 Second, the
Court stated that “PACs are burdensome alternatives . . . [that] are expensive
to administer and subject to extensive regulations.”107 Among other things,
the Court identified the requirements that PACs regularly disclose the dona-
tions they receive and contributions and expenditures they give as features
that make the vehicle an onerous alternative to direct political activity.108
Citizens United relieved corporations and labor unions of this encumbrance,
freeing them to directly spend money from their general treasuries in federal
elections.109
Like corporations prior to Citizens United, religious organizations can-
not make independent expenditures in elections due to the electioneering
prohibition. As Branch Ministries v. Rossotti suggests, however, such entities
may form 501(c)(4)s with affiliated PACs to engage in political activity.110
But Citizens United’s rejection of the idea that PACs constitute a separate
avenue for corporate political speech applies with equal or greater force to
the proposed vehicle for religious speech. To engage in the full panoply of
political activity, a religious organization must operate not one, but two en-
tities. If operating a PAC is a burdensome alternative to directly making
independent expenditures, then operating a 501(c)(4) and PAC is even more
burdensome.111 And just as the PAC exception to the corporate-expenditure
ban in Citizens United did not allow corporations to speak,112 the ability for
religious organizations to form 501(c)(4)s with affiliated PACs does not re-
move the burden on free exercise of religion imposed by the electioneering
prohibition.
If the electioneering prohibition remains legal in the aftermath of Hobby
Lobby and Citizens United, a claim for a RFRA exemption to the prohibition
is likely to advance past the substantial burden stage of the test.
105. Id. § 441b(b)(2).
106. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 338–39.
109. Id. at 365; see also Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per
curiam) (extending Citizens United to invalidate Montana’s corporate independent expendi-
ture ban).
110. 211 F.3d 137, 143–44 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
111. See Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 143–44.
112. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337.
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III. The Electioneering Prohibition Ensures Separation
Between Church and State
Although the electioneering prohibition substantially burdens the free
exercise of religion, RFRA permits facially neutral laws that encroach on
religious practice if they are the least restrictive means of serving a compel-
ling state interest.113 While the electioneering prohibition may provide salu-
tatory benefits for American democracy by limiting the corrupting influence
of undisclosed spending in elections and government subsidization of parti-
san politics, Section III.A argues that these interests cannot insulate the law
from invalidation under RFRA’s strict scrutiny analysis. Section III.B, how-
ever, argues that the electioneering prohibition can be justified as the least
restrictive means of preventing undue entanglement between government
and religion. Paradoxically, greater accommodation of religious dissent ne-
cessitates a higher degree of government intrusion in religious entities’ af-
fairs. Rather than argue that the electioneering prohibition serves an
important role in American democracy in spite of its impact on religious
freedom, supporters should emphasize the critical way in which it promotes
religious practice by keeping the spheres of government and religion
separate.
A. Unavailable Government Interests
The electioneering prohibition is not narrowly tailored to the govern-
ment’s interest in combating corruption or its interest in preventing tax-
payer subsidization of partisan political activity.
1. Anticorruption Rationale
Citizens United forecloses an argument that the electioneering prohibi-
tion can be justified as a prophylaxis against the corrupting influence of
unlimited, undisclosed spending in elections. As discussed supra, religious
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012). Hobby Lobby contains ambiguous analysis of the
RFRA test, with the majority arguing that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5, modified RFRA by requiring accommo-
dation of religion “to the maximum extent permitted.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761–62 (2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2012)). The majority made
this argument, however, to rebut the principal dissent’s suggestion that the Free Exercise
Clause case law prior to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which RFRA restored, denied Free Exercise Clause protection to
corporations. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2772 (“It is simply not possible to read these provi-
sions as restricting the concept of the ‘exercise of religion’ to those practices specifically ad-
dressed in our pre-Smith decisions.”). This line of reasoning has potentially broad
consequences if divorce of RFRA from prior First Amendment jurisprudence requires some
sort of scrutiny even more robust than traditional strict scrutiny. This Note, however, assumes
that RFRA demands a level of judicial review no more searching than that required in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (requiring government action that substantially burdens
religious practice to be justified by a compelling state interest).
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organizations operating under the electioneering prohibition find them-
selves similarly situated to corporations and labor unions prior to the
landmark campaign finance decision.114 Just as Citizens United undercuts the
argument that alternative vehicles for engaging in politics minimizes the
burden that the electioneering prohibition imposes on religious practice, the
decision likely precludes justification of the provision on the grounds that it
combats the corrupting influence of money in politics. The Citizens United
Court held that the ban on corporate and union independent expenditures
could not be justified as furthering the government’s compelling interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance thereof.115 The Court reasoned that
independent political spending, in contrast to direct contributions from in-
dividuals and groups to candidates, carries less risk of corruption.116 The
Court elaborated that categorical bans on spending go “well beyond the
Government’s interest”117 and constitute an “asymmetrical” remedy.118 In-
stead, the Court held disclosure to be “a less restrictive alternative” to an
outright ban that provides critical information to voters and promotes
accountability.119
The 501(c)(3) electioneering prohibition, like the corporate and union
independent expenditure ban, categorically bars political spending by an en-
tity. Though RFRA protects religious practice, rather than freedom of
speech, any law that substantially burdens the free exercise of religion must
also be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.120 If the an-
ticorruption rationale could not rescue the corporate independent expendi-
ture ban from a free speech challenge, then it likely cannot provide safe
harbor for the electioneering prohibition under RFRA’s strict scrutiny anal-
ysis. As with the corporate independent expenditure ban, the electioneering
prohibition goes beyond restricting the direct flow of money to political
candidates that the Court has deemed corruptive.121 Any risk of corruption
posed by 501(c)(3) campaign spending also appears minimal when one con-
siders the amount of unrestricted and undisclosed spending by social welfare
organizations in the wake of Citizens United.122 Tax-exempt 501(c)(4)s spent
over $257 million on independent expenditures in the 2012 presidential and
congressional elections alone, 123 and undisclosed spending accounted for
114. See supra Section II.C.
115. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 361.
119. Id. at 369–71.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403
(1963).
121. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
122. Cf. Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 360 (“[I]ndependent expenditures do not lead to, or
create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption. In fact, there is only scant evidence that
independent expenditures even ingratiate.”).
123. Outside Spending, OpenSecrets.org, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/
fes_summ.php?cycle=2012 [http://perma.cc/7NZG-9HY5].
February 2016] The Threat “God PACs” Pose to Democracy and Religion 639
over 30 percent of the money spent by outside groups.124 With unregulated
money already playing such a large role in elections, the electioneering pro-
hibition surely cannot be justified by whatever additional corrupting conse-
quences it holds at bay. Just as disclosure constituted a less restrictive
alternative to the corporate independent expenditure ban, increasing report-
ing requirements for politically active 501(c)(3)s would infringe on the free
exercise of religion to a lesser degree than an outright ban on partisan politi-
cal activity by religious organizations.
One might argue that houses of worship pose a special risk as conduits
of political spending because of the rules that govern their formation. For
example, houses of worship, unlike other 501(c)(3) organizations, need not
file with the IRS to begin receiving tax benefits.125 Without the election-
eering prohibition, individuals interested in spending and soliciting unlim-
ited amounts of money in elections could declare themselves a house of
worship without any determination by the IRS that the organization quali-
fies for tax-exempt status. But 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations can also
self-declare their proper classification and begin receiving tax benefits with-
out IRS scrutiny.126 To the extent that this exemption from the notice re-
quirements that apply to other 501(c)(3) organizations poses additional
corruption risks, requiring houses of worship that wish to engage in elec-
tioneering activity to file with the IRS would constitute a less restrictive
means of furthering the government’s goals. The special rules governing the
formation of houses of worship for taxation purposes do not justify an out-
right ban on electioneering activity.
2. Government Subsidization of Partisan Political Activity
While both the district and appellate courts in Branch Ministries, upheld
the electioneering prohibition on the grounds that it did not substantially
burden the free exercise of religion,127 the lower court also stated that the
provision constituted the least restrictive means of pursuing the compelling
interest in preventing government subsidization of partisan political activ-
ity.128 In an earlier case upholding the electioneering prohibition against a
challenge under the Free Exercise Clause,129 the Tenth Circuit characterized
tax-exempt status as a “matter[ ] of legislative grace.” 130 The conditions set
forth in § 501(c)(3), the court stated, “stem from the Congressional policy
124. Outside Spending by Disclosure, Excluding Party Committees, OpenSecrets.org,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/disclosure.php [http://perma.cc/4KGU-EWEZ].
125. 26 C.F.R. § 1.508-1(a)(3)(a) (2015); see also IRS, supra note 53, at 3.
126. See IRS, IRS Pub. 557, Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization 47–48 (2015),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf [http://perma.cc/3BP3-KY2V].
127. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Branch Ministries,
Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17, 24–27 (D.D.C. 1999).
128. Branch Ministries, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d at 25–26.
129. U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 2.
130. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854 (10th Cir.
1972).
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that the United States Treasury should be neutral in political affairs and that
substantial activities directed to attempts to influence legislation or affect a
political campaign should not be subsidized.”131 Whether in response to a
RFRA or Free Exercise Clause challenge, both courts reasoned that the elec-
tioneering prohibition could survive strict scrutiny because of the compel-
ling need for the federal government to remain neutral in partisan political
fights.
To the extent that the electioneering prohibition could be supported by
a political neutrality rationale before Citizens United fueled an explosion of
outside spending, 132 that justification cannot save the electioneering prohi-
bition today. One might distinguish 501(c)(3) organizations from the
501(c)(4) organizations newly involved in electoral politics because donors
to the former but not the latter can receive tax deductions for contribu-
tions.133 But the Supreme Court has treated tax-exempt status as a form of
subsidy. Upholding the IRS revocation of tax-exempt status to segregated
private schools,134 the Court in Bob Jones University v. United States reasoned
that “taxpayers can be said to be indirect and vicarious ‘donors’ ” to tax-
exempt organizations.135 Just as taxpayers provided indirect support for the
discriminatory policies of the colleges before the IRS took corrective action,
the government currently subsidizes the political activity of 501(c)(4) social
welfare organizations by according them tax-exempt status. Also, in Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Washington, which upheld § 501(c)(3)’s re-
striction on lobbying activity, the Court made no distinction between tax
exemptions and deductions, characterizing both as forms as government
subsidy.136
Beyond 501(c)(4) organizations, political organizations—which include
political parties, candidate committees, super PACs, traditional PACs, and
state issue advocacy organizations137—all qualify as tax-exempt organiza-
tions under § 527 of the tax code.138 Historically, political organizations did
not receive a tax exemption. Until 1975, the Code offered no formal tax
benefits to groups engaged in political activity, but the IRS treated contribu-
tions to such groups as nontaxable gifts. 139 Congress enacted § 527 in re-
sponse to the IRS decision in 1973 to begin taxing political groups.140
131. Id. (emphasis omitted).
132. See supra notes 122–124 and accompanying text.
133. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1), (c) (2012).
134. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
135. Id. at 591.
136. 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
137. See I.R.C. § 527(e)(1)–(2); Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1644,
1648 (2012).
138. I.R.C. § 527(a).
139. Erika Lunder, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33377, Tax-Exempt Organizations:
Political Activity Restrictions and Disclosure Requirements 17 (2007)
140. Id. at 17–18.
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Congress’s choice to grant tax-exempt status to political organizations
came with a significant price tag. For the subset of these organizations that
engages in federal electoral activity, receipts totaled over $8.8 billion in 2012
alone.141 If the federal government taxed the revenue raised by such groups
through donations in the same manner that it taxes for-profit corporations
(assuming no deductions, credits, or other means of reducing tax liability),
the IRS would collect an additional $3 billion in revenue.142 This figure does
not even take into account the receipts of 527s engaged in state and local
politics, which do not file with the Federal Election Commission.143 In short,
by extending tax-exempt status to social welfare and political organizations,
the federal government forgoes a significant amount of revenue. While a less
direct benefit than a tax deduction, a tax exemption certainly constitutes a
form of subsidy. Given the substantial indirect government benefits that re-
dound to other types of organizations besides 501(c)(3)s engaged in partisan
political activity, the federal government cannot justify an outright ban on
political speech based on a supposed preference to keep taxpayer dollars out
of politics.
B. Maintaining the Wall Between Church and State
When the Tenth Circuit upheld the electioneering prohibition under the
Free Exercise Clause,144 it stated that the policy serves the “overwhelming
and compelling Governmental interest . . . of guarantying that the wall sepa-
rating church and state remain[s] high and firm.”145 The court did not ex-
plain how removing the prohibition would undermine the Establishment
Clause, and its treatment of the issue seems conclusory. But a closer exami-
nation of the Tenth Circuit’s rationale offers a fruitful defense of the elec-
tioneering prohibition.
By arguing that the electioneering prohibition serves the government’s
compelling interest in maintaining a strong separation between church and
state, this Note does not make the stronger claim that the electioneering
prohibition is constitutionally required. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
confirms that government accommodation of religious practice does not, by
141. FEC, 2012 Committee Summary, http://fec.gov/data/CommitteeSummary.do?for
mat=csv&election_yr=2012 [http://perma.cc/NJ6X-5GA3] (sum of entries in column labeled
“tot_rec”).
142. This calculation is based on application of tax brackets described in I.R.C. § 11(b) to
total receipts of each political organization that filed with the Federal Election Commission
during the 2012 election cycle.
143. See Political Committee Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 5,595, 5,598 (Feb. 7, 2007) (to be codi-
fied at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100) (“[V]irtually all political committees are 527 organizations. It does
not necessarily follow that all 527 organizations are or should be registered as political com-
mittees. . . . By definition, 527 organizations may engage in a host of State, local, and non-
electoral activity well outside the Commission’s jurisdiction.”).
144. U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 2.
145. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir.
1972).
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itself, offend First Amendment principles. 146 And minimal levels of political
activity by houses of worship—such as a religious leader endorsing a candi-
date from the pulpit—would not raise Establishment Clause concerns. But
more extensive political involvement—such as funding independent expend-
itures—could prompt more invasive government efforts to police the activi-
ties of tax-subsidized religious groups. Conceivably, RFRA may permit the
government to guard against Establishment Clause violations by drawing a
bright line preventing the religious groups it subsidizes from engaging in
activity likely to lead to intrusive oversight. 147 By prohibiting activities by
tax-subsidized groups that carry a demonstrated risk of entangling the gov-
ernment in the internal affairs of religious entities, the electioneering prohi-
bition furthers the government’s compelling interest in reinforcing the wall
separating church and state.
Lemon v. Kurtzman provides the reigning test for identifying an Estab-
lishment Clause violation and therefore provides a useful framework for
identifying entanglement threats posed by permitting political activity by
religious organizations.148 For a statute to be valid under the Establishment
Clause it (1) must have a secular legislative purpose, (2) must not have the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) must not lead to
excessive entanglement between government and religion.149
Exempting religious organizations from the electioneering prohibition
would not run afoul of the secular purpose requirement. The Supreme
146. E.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719–20 (2005) (upholding RLUIPA); Corp. of
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 338, 340 (1987) (upholding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s religious exemp-
tion); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1987) (“This
Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate
religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.”).
147. The Court has acknowledged that “[a]t some point, accommodation may devolve
into an ‘unlawful fostering of religion.’ ” Amos, 483 U.S. at 334–35 (quoting Hobbie, 480 U.S.
at 145). In addition, the Court has noted that facially valid religious exemptions may be chal-
lenged under the Establishment Clause on an as-applied basis when they impose significant
burdens on third parties. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725–26. Without question, Congress has a com-
pelling interest in preventing core Establishment Clause violations. I contend further that this
interest extends to providing prophylactic protection by preempting as-applied challenges that
would emerge when a law is deemed likely to lead to entanglement between government and
religion or government endorsement of religion.
148. Some scholars and jurists believe Lemon v. Kurtzman and its progeny distorted the
original meaning of the Establishment Clause. See supra note 30. Nevertheless, the Lemon test
“remains the prevailing analytical tool for the analysis of Establishment Clause claims.” Doe ex
rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 849 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Books v. City of
Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 301 (7th Cir. 2000)). For recent examples of applications of the Lemon
test by appellate courts, see, Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 760 F.3d 227,
237–45 (2d Cir. 2014); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 101–02 (4th Cir. 2013); Barnes-
Wallace v. City of San Diego, 704 F.3d 1067, 1082–84 (9th Cir. 2012); Satawa v. Macomb Cty.
Rd. Comm’n, 689 F.3d 506, 526–28 (6th Cir. 2012). The analysis that follows will likely prove
unpersuasive and unsatisfying for those who reject the Lemon test entirely, but this Note as-
sumes the continuing viability of the Lemon framework.
149. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
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Court has recognized the desire to “alleviate significant governmental inter-
ference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out
their religious missions” as a permissible legislative purpose.150 In this vein,
an exemption from the electioneering prohibition would not have the ad-
vancement of religion as its primary effect, because it merely eliminates a
government-imposed obstacle to religious groups furthering their goals
through the political process.
Nor would a religious exemption from the electioneering prohibition
have the primary effect of enhancing or inhibiting religion. In Amos, the
Court clarified that a law does not fail the “primary effect” prong of the
Lemon test “simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is
their very purpose.”151 Rather, for a law to have the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion, “the government itself [must] advance[ ] religion through
its own activities and influence.”152 While permitting religious organizations
to electioneer undoubtedly would enhance the ability of such entities to fur-
ther their religious missions, any fruits of religious organizations’ political
activity would be the product of the groups’ efforts, not the government’s
designs. The facial validity of the electioneering prohibition under the
Lemon test’s first two prongs underscores that, in many contexts, the govern-
ment can and should grant religious accommodations when the accommo-
dations create no perceivable risk of Establishment Clause violations.
Lifting the electioneering prohibition, however, could lead to an exces-
sive entanglement between government and religion. While an exemption
from the electioneering prohibition would not inevitably lead to such entan-
glement, it would create a risk sufficient to justify the prohibition as a pro-
phylactic measure without violating RFRA. In Lemon, the Court held that
state financial assistance of private parochial schools created an excessive en-
tanglement between government and religion and violated the Establish-
ment Clause.153 Because the programs invalidated in Lemon as a condition
for aid required subsidized teachers to refrain from teaching religious con-
tent, the Supreme Court found that the law required “comprehensive, dis-
criminating, and continuing state surveillance” to ensure adherence to the
conditions. This created an “excessive and enduring entanglement between
state and church.”154
Similarly, lifting the electioneering prohibition would likely prompt
more invasive IRS involvement in the day-to-day activities of religious orga-
nizations that engage in substantial amounts of political activity. While
501(c)(3)s cannot electioneer, they can lobby elected officials and govern-
ment agencies under current law, so long as the activity does not constitute a
“substantial part” of their efforts.155 To determine whether organizations
150. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335.
151. Id. at 337.
152. Id.
153. 403 U.S. at 613–14.
154. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618–22.
155. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
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have devoted a substantial amount of their activities to lobbying, the IRS
engages in a subjective, fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiry that assesses the
amount of time devoted to lobbying, the amount of money the organization
spends on the activity, the importance of lobbying to the organization’s pur-
pose, and the continuity of its lobbying efforts.156 This test ensures that
501(c)(3)s serve the purposes contemplated by the statute157 and do not
function merely as vehicles for untaxed political advocacy.
If 501(c)(3)s could electioneer, the IRS would undoubtedly monitor
their activities to ensure that they do not become mere conduits for electoral
political activity at the expense of their designed purposes. Under the sub-
stantial part test or something akin to it, the IRS would have to separate the
activities of religious organizations into the “political” on the one hand, and
the “religious” on the other. These determinations would involve invasive
inquiries into religious doctrine by a government entity. Moreover, when
oversight raises red flags, continued enjoyment of tax benefits would require
religious organizations to deviate from the activities they deem conducive to
their missions and instead conduct themselves in a fashion that the govern-
ment considers consonant with its own conception of religious practice.
The controversy surrounding IRS efforts to monitor the activities of po-
litically engaged nonprofits in the aftermath of Citizens United provides a
clear illustration of the invasive oversight that the electioneering prohibition
averts. In an effort beginning in 2010 to identify groups abusing nonprofit
status by primarily engaging in partisan political activity, the IRS requested
information about the activities of nearly 300 politically active groups. 158
Documents disclosed during a subsequent investigation of the IRS’s conduct
reveal that the agency requested detailed information about the qualifica-
tions of group leaders to educate the public about particular issues and orga-
nizational priorities.159 The IRS also requested copies of materials
disseminated to the public and used for legislative advocacy purposes.160
While a Treasury Department investigation of IRS oversight found the effort
tainted by potentially partisan criteria for selecting inquiry targets,161 the
investigation revealed the degree of intrusion that nonprofits could expect if
the IRS policed their activity.
156. Lunder, supra note 139, at 6–7; Measuring Lobbying: Substantial Part Test, IRS, http://
www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Measuring-Lobbying:-Substantial-Part-Test [http://per
ma.cc/APA8-RTKS].
157. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (“[501(c)(3)s are] organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes
. . . .”).
158. Juliet Eilperin, Report Details IRS Scrutiny, Wash. Post, May 13, 2013, at A1.
159. Jonathan Weisman, I.R.S. Scrutiny Went Beyond the Political, N.Y. Times, July 5,
2013, at A1.
160. Id.
161. Treasury Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Ref. No. 2013-10-053, Inappropriate
Criteria Were Used to Identify Tax-Exempt Applications for Review 5–10 (2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf [http://perma.cc/
5DDC-KZBS].
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If forced to distinguish organizations’ religious activities from political
activities, the IRS would be compelled to probe into matters of religious
doctrine and make judgment calls as to whether activity reflects adherence
to religious conviction or a political agenda. Consider how the IRS would
evaluate the following hypothetical examples:
Illustration A: In 2005, the Twenty-Fifth General Synod of the United
Church of Christ (UCC) passed a resolution opposing cuts to social safety-
net programs based on the Bible’s teachings about poverty and urged op-
position to such budget cuts.162 Based on this resolution, a UCC pastor
publishes an article in the church bulletin urging congregants to vote
against the local congressman who supported the House leadership’s 2015
budget containing deep cuts to social safety-net program funding.163
Illustration B: In 2015, the Orthodox Union (OU), the largest umbrella
organization for Orthodox Jewish congregations in America,164 adopted a
resolution expressing its views on negotiations between the United States
and Iran on nuclear proliferation.165 Citing “grave[ ] conern[s]” over the
threat of a nuclear Iran to Israel, the resolution emphasized its belief that
“no deal is better than a bad deal” that would allow Iran to develop nuclear
capability.166 Two months before the 2016 election, the Orthodox Union
publishes a voter guide rating members of Congress based on their posi-
tions on the negotiations.
Would the IRS classify the conduct in each illustration as religious or politi-
cal? The UCC resolution references scripture, while the OU resolution does
not. But Israel undeniably plays a central role in the Jewish faith.167 Would
the IRS promulgate a rule requiring religious textual references in organiza-
tional advocacy for the agency to deem the conduct religious rather than
political? Is the OU resolution better understood as a manifestation of faith
or as a political expression of Jewish nationalism?168 Both? Each illustration
involves action by religious organizations in furtherance of a resolution
162. Twenty-Fifth General Synod of the United Church of Christ, To Advance




163. Jonathan Weisman, Republicans Propose Budget with Deep Cuts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18,
2015, at A16.
164. About the OU Advocacy Center, Orthodox Union Advocacy Center, http://advo-
cacy.ou.org/about/ [http://perma.cc/DVD8-H2Q6].
165. OU Policy Resolution: The Iranian Threat, Orthodox Union Advocacy Center
(Feb. 6, 2015, 12:19 PM), http://advocacy.ou.org/2015/ou-policy-resolution-iranian-threat/
[http://perma.cc/92RR-N83H].
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Psalms 137:5–6 (“If I forget you, O Jerusalem, let my right hand wither; let
my tongue stick to my palate if I cease to think of you, If I do not keep Jerusalem in memory
even at my happiest hour.”).
168. See, e.g., Jacob Klatzkin, Judaism Is Nationalism, in Arthur Hertzberg, The Zion-
ist Idea 316–18 (Atheneum 1970) (1959).
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passed by a religious movement. Would the IRS classify political activity re-
lated to such resolutions as per se religious?
Evaluation of religious groups’ activities would also likely replicate pro-
longed efforts by the Federal Election Commission and courts to define po-
litical activity in the campaign finance context. The UCC pastor’s letter
contained an express appeal to vote against an incumbent, whereas the OU
congregation’s voter guide contained no such direct appeal. But given the
OU’s strong stance on the threat of Iran to Israel, congregants would likely
interpret the voter guide as urging them to vote for members of Congress
with high ratings. Would the IRS classify only direct appeals to vote for or
against candidates as political advocacy?169 Or adopting a more deferential
position, it might classify all advocacy as religious except the kind “suscepti-
ble of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate.”170 Either rule would constitute a government
agency’s judgment that certain types of communication are more political
than religious in nature, even when a religious organization believes that
such activity is central to its faith mission.
In other contexts, religious organizations have recognized the threat that
such entanglement poses to their own goals. The Union for Reform Judaism,
the largest Jewish denomination in North America 171 and a staunch propo-
nent of separation of church and state,172 has repeatedly opposed govern-
ment sources of funding that could benefit its own congregations. 173 It has
done so partially as a matter of principle, seeking to legitimize its opposition
to legislation that it believes violates the Establishment Clause.174 But it also
asserts its self-interest, arguing, “if we are now to be treated the same as
[secular organizations], then all the rules, regulations, audits, monitoring,
169. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52 (1976).
170. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007).
171. History, Union for Reform Judaism, http://urj.org/about/union/history/ [http://per
ma.cc/SSX6-J6S6].
172. 48th Gen. Assembly of the Union for Am. Hebrew Congregations, Separation of
Church and State, Union for Reform Judaism (1965), http://urj.org//about/union/govern-
ance/reso//?syspage=article&item_id=2254 [http://perma.cc/CW6N-JBGF].
173. E.g., Energy Efficiency Bills: Hearing on S. 717, S. 1084, S. 1191, S. 1199, S. 1200, S.
1205, S. 1206, S. 1209, and S. 1213 Before Subcomm. on Energy of the S. Comm. on Energy and
Natural Res., 113th Cong. 88–89 (2013) (statement of Rabbi David Saperstein, Director and
Counsel, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism); Constitutional Role of Faith-Based Orga-
nizations in Competitions for Federal Social Service Funds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 27–32 (2001) [hereinafter Faith-
Based Organizations] (statement of Rabbi David N. Saperstein, Director, Religious Action
Center of Reform Judaism); Letter from Robert Heller, Chair, Union for Reform Judaism Bd.
of Trustees and Rabbi David Saperstein, Dir., Religious Action Ctr. of Reform Judaism to
Rabbis, Presidents, and Temple Admr’s (Oct. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from Robert Hel-
ler], http://synagoguestrategies.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/URJ-2004-DHS-Funding-
Security-memo-03072015.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ULY-7L5D].
174. Letter from Robert Heller, supra note 173, at 2 (“If we abandon that position and say
that such direct support is Constitutional, then we are going down the road to parochiaid and
government funded religions, which have been a disaster in so many nations.”).
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entanglement and interference that religion uniquely has been spared will
now accompany government money.”175 Rabbi David Saperstein, former Di-
rector of the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, opposed govern-
ment funding of religious social service programs, saying, “[w]ith
government money comes government rules, regulation, audits, monitoring,
interference and control.”176
These observations do not necessarily demonstrate that permitting re-
ligious organizations to electioneer would invariably lead to entanglement
whenever such entities decided to participate in the electoral process. Unlike
the subsidies struck down in Lemon v. Kurtzman that conditioned aid on
restrictions that required government monitoring,177 increased government
involvement in religious groups’ affairs is not an indispensible feature of
lifting the electioneering prohibition. When evaluating religious entities’
electioneering activity, the amount of IRS scrutiny would likely depend on
the amount of political work done by the organizations and the degree to
which such work appears to predominate as the organization’s purpose. Ab-
sent the electioneering prohibition, the government could wait for as-ap-
plied challenges to emerge to sort out when unrestricted political activity by
religious groups leads to excessive entanglement. But since a clear potential
for such outcomes seems likely, RFRA’s compelling interest prong leaves lat-
itude for the government to act prophylactically to prevent such situations
before they arise.
The electioneering prohibition is narrowly tailored to the compelling
interest in preventing entanglement between government and religion.
There is simply no noninvasive means for the government to permit relig-
ious organizations to electioneer while also ensuring that political activity
does not overtake the religious activity that the government wished to incen-
tivize by granting tax-exempt status.
Conclusion
Despite prior affirmation of the legality of the 501(c)(3) electioneering
prohibition by courts of appeals, recent Supreme Court decisions raise new
threats to the provision. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. articulates a
significantly more deferential interpretation of RFRA’s “substantial burden”
prong, prohibiting courts from inquiring into the degree of attenuation be-
tween a government policy and religious belief. This interpretation of RFRA
would make it very difficult for the government to deny a religious organiza-
tion’s request for an exemption from the electioneering prohibition on the
grounds that it does not substantially burden the free exercise of religion.
175. Id.
176. Faith-Based Organizations, supra note 173, at 28.
177. 403 U.S. 602, 619–21 (1971).
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The rationale of Citizens United v. FEC prevents the government from
asserting its desire to prevent political corruption or subsidization of parti-
san political activity as a compelling state interest justifying the election-
eering prohibition. Citizens United rejected the anticorruption rationale as a
justification for the ban on corporate or union independent expenditures,
suggesting that the interest cannot preserve the similarly structured election-
eering prohibition. Further, the proliferation of nonprofit political activity
as a result of Citizens United—coupled with the tax benefits that political
organizations have long enjoyed—undermines any suggestion that the elec-
tioneering prohibition has the prevention of government subsidy of partisan
political activity as its chief purpose.
The electioneering prohibition can, however, survive RFRA review be-
cause of its key role in preventing entanglement between government and
religion. The provision holds at bay intrusive IRS inquiry of religious orga-
nizational activity that would accompany engagement in partisan politics.
Because the electioneering prohibition is narrowly tailored to the compelling
state interest in ensuring separation between church and state, the tax code
provision can and should survive RFRA review despite the sweeping changes
ushered in by Hobby Lobby and Citizens United.
